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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------~------~~~~-------~------~--------~----~~-~ 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
ROOALD LEMOYNE KELLY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19253 
--------~-----------------~--------------------------------~ 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with criminal homicide, murder in 
the first degree, a capital offense under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-202(1) Cd) Cl953J, as amended, in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge, presiding. 
Appellant elected a bench trial and was found guilty as 
charged on April 14, 1983. On June 18, 1983, appellant was 
sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Respondent seeks affirmance of appellant's conviction 
and sentence rendered below. 
At about 3:00 a.m., February 9, 1982, Elizabeth 
Langford and Clark Campbell awoke to a loud scream from the 
apartment above them at 604 South Fifth East. The scream was 
followed by loud banging noises which lasted for about fifteen 
minutes (R. 538-40, 567-68). Elizabeth heard footsteps coming 
out of the apartment above them and down the steps. With Clark, 
she looked through the front window, and saw a man leaving the 
apartment house CR. 540-43). He was dark, had dark hair, was 
slim and of average height. He wore dark pants and a blue or 
black parka with a red "V"-shaped stripe on the back (R. 544, 
570). The man crossed Sixth South and headed East toward Trolley 
Square CR. 545). Clark went across the street and called the 
police on a pay phone ten to fifteen minutes later (R. 564). 
Officer Frank Hatton-Ward and Officer Lyman responded 
to Clark's call, arriving at the apartment house at 3:30 a.m. (R. 
596-7, 605). As they walked to the apartment house, both 
officers noticed footprints in the snow going into and leaving 
the apartment house for which the complaint was sent. .l.d... 
Officer Hatton-Ward proceeded upstairs and entered the victim's 
apartment after no one responded to his knocking. He found Carla 
Taylor's body, partially clothed, in a pool of blood with a 
blanket over her face and a large, black knife in the middle of 
her chest. A toothbrush had been inserted in her vagina (R. 599-
600). An autopsy later revealed four stab wounds, one over the 
left chest, two over the left neck and one partially severing the 
victim's lip. There were also superficial scrapes and bruises 
over the victim's neck, shoulders and buttocks (R. 843-4). The 
chest wound went through the heart, a lung, and out the victim's 
back (R. 845). After determining that Carla was dead, Hatton-
Ward made a quick check of the apartment and found no one other 
than two sleeping infants in cribs (R. 600). The children were 
later identified as the victim's. He then reported the death to 
his superiors. 
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Officer Martin followed the footprints a short distance 
east on Sixth South. Officer Ken Farnsworth continued the 
pursuit while Martin followed in his car and Officer Bernards 
paralleled Farnsworth on the opposite side of the street (R. 634-
~J The prints were easy to follow because three inches of fresh 
snow had fallen earlier that night (R. 642). Also, the shoeprint 
was unique and easy to distinguish from the few others that 
Fransworth saw CR. 660). At Ninth East, however, the prints left 
the sidewalk and disappeared into the middle of the street CR. 
665). Farnsworth lost the prints and did not find them again 
until they came out of the street and entered Brixen Court CR. 
666). Farnsworth followed the prints until they angled toward 
the appellant's front porch. He examined one other set of 
prints, which led down an alley and disappeared and al so looked 
on all sides of the house for other prints resembling the unique 
ones he had been following CR. 668-671). After finding no other 
prints at all, Farnsworth sent Officer Bernards to the rear of 
the house while he knocked at the front door CR. 671). The time 
was 4:00 a.m.; Farnsworth had been in pursuit for fifteen minutes 
IR. 706). Appellant answered the door and Farnsworth said that 
there had been a homicide and that he had followed footprints 
from the scene to appellant's house. He said that he wanted to 
ask to appellant about it and asked for permission to enter 
IR. 672). Appellant stepped back, opened the door and let 
Farnsworth in CR. 672). 
Immediately upon entering, Farnsworth saw a dark blue 
coat with a read "V"-shaped stripe on it similar to the 
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description given over the radio dispatch. Farnsworth then asked 
appellant if he had been out that night. Appellant replied that 
he had been to the Tri-Arc earlier, but that he had been home for 
two hours CR. 673-74). Appellant, who was wearing boxer shorts, 
went into his bedroom to put on a pair of pants. Farnsworth 
followed and asked him what shoes he had worn that night. 
Appellant pointed to or handed Farnsworth a pair of gym shoes at 
the foot of the bed CR. 674). Farnsworth looked at the shoes, 
noticed that they possessed the same unique print as those he had 
followed and that they were damp CR. 674-75). 
Detective Farnsworth then asked appellant if he had 
stabbed or killed anyone that night. Appellant answered "Are you 
serious?". Farnsworth replied that he was very serious and 
repeated the question. Receiving no answer, Farnsworth read 
appellant his Mi~.da rights. While Farnsworth was reading the 
rights from a .M.iI.illl.da card, appellant interrupted to say that he 
knew his rights and was familiar with them. Appellant also 
stated that he was on probation CR. 677). Farnsworth said that 
he wanted to finish reading the card anyway as a formality. l.d... 
Farnsworth then asked appellant if he wanted to answer any 
questions. Appellant responded, "I don't know, it depends". 
Farnsworth said "that's not the right answer. It's either yes or 
no". He then said that he had followed footprints from the scene 
of a homicide at 604 South Fifth East to appellant's home which 
appeared to be made by appellant's shoes. He then asked 
appellant if he had been to the crime scene that night CR. 675-
77). When appellant made no response, Farnsworth then asked what 
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clothes appellant had worn that evening. Appellant indicated a 
pair of black pants and matching shirt and two pair of socks. 
Farnsworth picked up the clothing, along with the coat and shoes 
IR. 678-80). 
Farnsworth told appellant that he would have to 
accompany him to the police station for questioning. However, 
Farnsworth did not formally arrest appellant (R. 675, 681). 
At this point, within a minute and a half of the .MiI.an~ waiver 
question, appellant told Farnsworth that "I want to level with 
you guys. I do know someone who lives down there. I was down to 
the apartment house on the other side of the street". Officer 
Bernards who had entered the house when Farnsworth and appellant 
went into the bedroom, mentioned the Caledonia across the street 
from the scene and appellant affirmed that he had been there, 
never indicating that he had visited the victim's apartment house 
IR. 682). From this point on, appellant showed no hesitation in 
his answers to Farnsworth's questions (R. 717). Before leaving 
with appellant, the officers conducted a quick search of the 
home, looking for other persons after Farnsworth received 
permission from appellant to do so (R. 452-3). No one else was 
found, but Bernards saw a pair of gloves on the bathroom floor 
that had dark specks on them. Farnsworth asked appellant if he 
had worn them that night. Appellant said he had. Farnsworth, as 
evidence custodian, took the gloves with him (R. 683). 
Appellant and Farnsworth had several conversations in 
the police car on the way to the police station. Appellant 
admitted that he knew Darla Cates, who had lived across the hall 
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from the victim. Appellant then requested to be handcuffed, 
claiming that he was scared and did not know what he was going to 
do. He said that if he could kill the officers and get away, he 
would CR. 685-86). On the way to the station, Farnsworth, 
appellant and another officer returned momentarily to the scene 
of the murder. While they were there the two infants in the 
victim's apartment were brought out of the apartment. The 
appellant asked, with emotion, if they were dead. Farnsworth 
answered that he did not think so. Then the grief and appearance 
of crying came over appellant's face as he said, "If only Darla 
had been there" CR. 688-9). Darla Cates had lived with Jerome 
Thornton in the apartment across the hall from the victim and was 
a good friend of both the victim and appellant CR. 646, 648). 
However, she had moved three weeks before the crime CR. 649-50). 
Darla had moved because of problems in her relationship 
with Thornton. She had on at least one occasion spent the night 
at appellant's house prior to moving CR. 728). 
Upon reaching the police station, Farnsworth turned 
appellant over to Detective Chapman, who then re-read appellant 
his Miz.an.Qa rights. Appellant indicated his understanding of 
those rights and agreed to talk CR. 916) • During questioning, 
appellant stated that he was in the victim's apartment building 
to see Jerome Thornton, who was living in Ms. Cates' old 
apartment across from the victim's CR. 918l. Appellant claimed he 
rang Thornton's door bell and left when no one answered CR. 919). 
Thornton indicated at trial that he had been home in his 
apartment on the night of the crime and had been awakened by 
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screams <R. 809-12). Thornton, a light sleeper, did not hear his 
doorbell before the screams (R. 813). The door bell is easily 
audible throughout Thornton's apartment (R. 921). 
An autopsy revealed that the victim had died of 
111ulli1Jle stab wounds. During the autopsy, three pubic hairs were 
discovered on the lower portion of the victim's buttocks 
IR. 848). These were sent to the F.B.I. crime lab for analysis 
~ong with appellant's coat and other clothing. Analysis showed 
that the blood on appellant's coat and shoelace was consistent 
with the victim's blood type and not with appellant's (R. 962, 
966). Blood was also found on the instep of appellant's gym shoe 
and gloves <R. 972). A pubic hair sample taken from appellant 
had twenty individual microscopic characteristics (R 1037-38). 
The three hairs from the victim's buttock's were indistinguish-
able from the sample taken from appellant. Mike Malone, a hair 
analysis expert with the F.B.I., stated that the hairs taken from 
the victim's body came from appellant or another person whose 
hair had the same twenty characteristics. He also stated that 
out of 20 ,000 samples he had examined, there were only two 
occasions when samples from two different people were 
indistinguishable (R. 1040). Also, during the autopsy a bruise 
pattern was discovered on the victim's neck. At trial, Monique 
Ryser, an assistant medical examiner, testified that the pattern 
was consistent with the pattern on appellant's gym shoe (R. 
1073). There were also two wounds to the victim's vagina, one 
caused by bruising and the other by cutting (R. 855). The 
cutting injury was more likely caused by the toothbrush CR. 855), 
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while the bruising could have been caused by a forceful insertion 
of a penis Cr. 852). No semen or seminal fluid was found in the 
vaginal area CR. 857). However, appellant's expert, Dr. Howard 
Berk, an obstetrician-gynecologist, testified that at least a 
third of all men have some sexual disfunction during the process 
of rape CR. 1138>. Sexual disfunction involves either difficulty 
in attaining or maintaining an erection or difficulty in having 
ejaculation (R. 1140). 
Prior to trial, appellant moved for suppression of both 
the clothing seized and the statements he had made to Officer 
Farnsworth. The motion was denied and the evidence was admitted 
at trial ( R. 25 9). 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE TAKEN FROM APPELLANT'S 
RESIDENCE WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL. 
Appellant's Points I and rv both challenge the 
admissibility of certain items of evidence presented at trial by 
the prosecution. Specifically, appellant's Point I complains 
that his gym shoes were the product of an illegal seizure. Point 
IV, while mentioning the shoes, focuses on appellant's pants and 
gloves. Appellant claims that the pants were illegally seized 
and that the gloves were discovered and seized during an illegal 
search of his house. Respondent, in this point will present the 
seizure of each three items of evidence chronologically. 
A. SEIZURE OF THE SHOES. 
APPELLANT'S SHOES WERE PROPERLY SEIZED 
UNDER THE PLAIN VIEW EXCEPTION TO THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH WARRANT REQUIREMENT. 
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A plain view seizure is justified if an officer has 
lawfully made an initial intrusion or is otherwise in a position 
from which he can view a particular area. .COQli~_y_._~ 
.aamp~bi.r.e, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Next, the evidence must be in 
plain view. ~1a1~_Yi_Rom.e..t.Q, Utah, 660 P.2d 715, 718 (1983). 
Last, the evidence must be clearly incriminating. .B.QmeID, 660 
P.2d at 718. The "clearly incriminating" standard was recently 
clarified by the United States Supreme Court in .l'.e~_Yi_5LD~n, 
U.S. -~-' 103 S.Ct. 1535 (1983). Recently, The Court in 
SI~~n, noted the language in .cDDli~-Y~-N~~-B.am.p~hiL~, ~L~, 
which led to the "clearly incriminating• standard used in some 
jurisdictions, including Utah: 
••• It must be "immediately apparent" to 
the police that the items they observe may 
be evidence of a crime, contraband, or 
otherwise subject to seizure. 
U.S. at 470. In IUD~, ~~, the Court stated that the 
"immediately apparent" language first enunciated in ~i~Y.... 
N..e~_E.am.p.s.biL~, ~~, does .no1 require that the officer "know" 
that "certain items are contraband or evidence of a crime.• 
SI~~n, 103 s.ct. at 1542. Rather, a seizure of property in plain 
view is presumptively reasonable, assuming there is probable 
cause to associate the property with criminal activity.• l.da, 
quoting ~1DD-Yi_lie~-1~.Lk, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980). Thus facts 
that warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that 
certain items ~ be evidence of a crime are sufficient to 
support seizure of the items under the plain view doctrine. 
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Furthermore, the belief need not be more likely true than false. 
B.I.miD• 103 s.ct. at 1543. 
The United States Supreme Court also mentioned one 
other requirement for a proper "plain review" seizure of 
evidence: the evidence must be seen inadvertently. .C.OQli~, 
~.a, 403 U.S. 443, 469 <1971). The inadvertence requirement 
was approved by only a plurality of the .C.OQli~ Court and was 
specifically rejected by this Court in ~1.a1~_y ... _B.QID.eIQ, Utah, 660 
P.2d 715, 718 (n.3> (1983). Language in a case decided shortly 
after B.QID.eIQ, ~1~~-Y ... _H.aIIiSr Utah, 671 P.2d 175, 181, (1983), 
suggests a reincorporation of the inadvertence requirement into 
the Utah plain view exception. However, Ha.r.ris, .s.JJ.Pia, involved 
facts where the officers seizing the evidence knew ~-g-~~I1.ai.nt~ 
that specific incriminating evidence was present in the area that 
they entered. .HaIIli, 671 P.2d at 181. Similarly, the cases 
cited by the H.aIIiS Court in invalidating that plain view seizure 
also involved situations where officers s'1li the evidence ~Q~ 
entering and seizing it. ~1.a1~_y ... _L.aJle, 175 Mont. 225, 573 P.2d 
198 (1977), ~1~_y..__Q.s..bQUlr 63 Ohio Misc. 17, 409N.E.2d 1077 
(1980), l'.e.Qpl.e_y..__l'.a.kJJl.a, 89 Ill. App. 3d 789, Ill. Dec. 919, 411 
N.E. 2d 1385 (1980). In these situations, a lU:~i.ntI.JJ.Si~ siting 
gives rise to probable cause and the accompanying necessity of 
securing a search warrant absent some exigency why warrant could 
not be obtained. HaIIis, 671 P.2d 181. Thus, HaIIis, .s.JJ.Pia, 
represents a very narrow modification of the Utah plain view 
doctrine as stated in B.QmeIQ, .s.Jll1I.a. Evidence may be seized 
under the plain view doctrine only if an officer did not know to 
a certainty via a preintrusive sighting that specific evidence 
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was in an area before the officer entered the area. Beyond this, 
RQ.llleL~r .s..J.lPI.ar is controlling, and there is thus no inadvertency 
requi rernent in the Utah plain view exception. 
However, the seizure of the shoes is valid even if the 
inadvertency requirement is totally incorporated into the Utah 
plain view exception under .B.a.r..ti..s, .s.J.1p.r.a. The inadvertence 
requi rernent is met when police have some expectation that 
evidence would be discovered in plain view, but this expectation 
does not rise to the level of probable cause. .llni1~E.t..a1~..s~ 
AnJ;.ill, 615 F.2d 648 (5th Cir.) Cl980l (per curiaml, ~.rJ;. 
Jie.n.i.e..Q, 449 u. S. 866 (1980). This expectation may range from a 
weak hunch to a strong suspicion. Dni1e.d__EJ;aJ;e..s_y~_.B.a.re, 589 
F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1979). 
The facts in the present case come well within the 
inadvertency requirement presented above. Officer Farnsworth did 
not have a preintrusive view of any seized evidence. The 
footprints leading to appellant's residence may have given him a 
strong suspicion that the shoes and their owner were within the 
Brixen Court home, but this suspicion does not rise to the level 
of probable cause and, in any event, did not give Farnsworth 
knowledge to a certainty that the shoes were within appellant's 
residence. The situation in the present case is thus 
distinguishable from .B.a.I:Ii..sr ~· and .B.aLii..S is therefore not 
controlling. Furthermore, ..Ha.L.Ii..s did not specifically overrule 
the Court's refusal to incorporate the inadvertence requirement 
into Utah's plain view exception. Until that is done, .BoJneL..Q, 
.5JJPL.Q, is controlling on the issue. 
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Appellant presents three major arguments in his Point 
I. First, he claims that Officer Farnsworth did not have prior 
justification to be in appellant's house; second, that Farnsworth 
did not have justification to follow appellant into his bedroom; 
third, that the incriminating nature of the shoes was not 
il!Dllediately apparent. 
Appellant claims that he allowed Farnsworth to enter 
his home out of mere acguiesence to perceived police authority. 
B.umpil.LY..J.o.r.tlL~.l.ina, 391 u.s. 543 (1968) • .l\.JJJllPti, ..sJJ~.u, 
deals with consent to search when the officer told the individual 
searched that he had a warrant. The search warrant, however, was 
invalid and was never shown to the individual. B~, 391 U.S. 
at 549. Farnsworth made no claim that he had a warrant. Nor did 
he make any coercive show of authority other than to identify 
himself as an officer looking for a suspect. Certainly it was 
reasonable for Farnsworth to identify himself and the business 
that he was about. There will always be some minimal coercion in 
situations like this, but it is not enough to create 
acquiescence. ~_J,'i~.e.s, Mont., 622 P.2d 203, 209 (1981) .1 
1 Appellant also complains in several places that even if he did 
give consent to Farnsworth's entry, he did not consent to offi-
cers Farnsworth's entry, he did not consent to Officers Bernard's 
and Martin's later entries. The number of officers entering 
appellant's house has no practical bearing upon the validity of 
his consent. Appellant waived his right to privacy when he al-
lowed Farnsworth to enter. Appellant's expectation of privacy 
was not further diminished by Bernard's and Martin's later 
entries. !ln.i.~States v~i.Q, 727 F.2d 786, 796-97 (Jlth Cir. 
1983). Furthermore, Bernard's and Martin's actions in entering 
are necessary steps which reasonable men of caution would take to 
neutralize a threat of harm which they might believe existed. 
l'f:L..t.¥-~...._.Ql)i.Q, 392 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1968). Certainly, given the 
nature of the crime and the ~~ib.i.l.i.ty that the felon might be 
within appellant's house, the officers acted with reasonable cau-
tion to insure that Farnsworth did not come to serious harm. 
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Secondly, Appellant claims that probable cause to 
arrest would be the only grounds for following him into his 
bedroom. This is not correct. Other exigent circumstances may 
y~e an officer the legal right to make a warrantless intrusion. 
Factors for determining the existence of exigent circumstances 
were defined in D.n.iteJLStates_Yi~b~Its~, 606 F.2d 853 C9th 
Cir. 1979). 
Exigent circumstances are those in 
which a substantial risk of harm to the 
persons involved or to the law enforcement 
process would arise if the police were to 
delay a search until a warrant could be 
obtained. The need for an immediate search 
must be apparent to the police, and so strong 
as to outweigh the important protection of 
individual rights provided by the warrant 
requirement. There must be no practical way 
to avoid these risks and yet follow the 
Constitution's mandate of detached judicial 
supervision of such intrusions. 
l\Q~LtSQD, 606 F.2d at 859. The question of whether exigent 
circumstances exist is one of fact requiring a review of the 
circumstance in each case. D.n.it~.d....Stat~S-Yi_B~~~. 667 F.2d 
1315, 1818 (9th Cir. 1982). 
In the present case, the facts support a finding of a 
substantial risk to Officer Farnsworth if he did not accompany 
appellant into his bedroom. Farnsworth had traced unique 
footprints from the scene of a homicide to appellant's home. 
Re had done so in a relatively short period of time--fifteen 
minutes. He made his initial entrance into the house with 
appellant's consent and immediately saw a parka in plain view 
which closely matched the description of one worn by an 
individual who left the general scene of the crime. At this 
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point, Officer Farnsworth may not have had probable cause to 
arrest, but he certainly had reason to be concerned about his own 
safety and to believe that he might incur a substantial risk of 
harm if he allowed appellant to enter unaccompanied into his 
bedroom. An officer may take necessary steps to neutralize a 
threat of harm which a man of reasonable caution might believe 
existed. ~y~l.e, Utah, 674 P.2d 119, 124 (1983), ~~ 
~~~.&-D.hi~, 392 u.s. 1, 21-23 <1968). ~~~ _gl,s~, D.ni.te~ 
~.a.t~..sy ... _.J.sm.e..s, 635 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1980) (warrantless entry 
allowed if wait would gravely endanger lives). As noted in the 
suppression hearing, Farnsworth remained with appellant at all 
times because of such fear. Also, there is no indication in the 
record that appellant complained of Officer Farnsworth' s movement 
into the bedroom. 
Appellant claims that the shoes were not clearly 
incriminating because they were not obviously contraband or 
weapons and the pattern on them was not noticed until after they 
were seized. Be contends that the "clearly incriminating" test 
is not satisfied unless Officer Farnsworth had ~.ba~l.e .s;.a.JJ..s.e to 
believe that the shoes were evidence of criminal activity, .c.i.tilul 
.C.OQl.idgs:_y~_ll~~_liamp..s.hi..t..e, 403 U.S.443 (1971). While ~j~, 
..s.upz.a,, ~ simply this, recent United States Supreme Court 
decisions allow a much lower standard. In ~-~~. 
U.S. __ , 103 S.Ct. 1535 (1983), the Court defined the 
"immediately apparent• requirement of the plain view doctrine. 
The Court indicated that probable cause was nsi.t the standard for 
determining that the incriminating nature of the evidence is 
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immediately apparent. Instead, the officer must only have a 
u.asQna.bll ~li.ef that certain items may be useful as evidence of 
a crime. 13.rQJiiD, .aJJ.PL9r at 1543. "Immediately apparent" does not 
dPmand that the officer's belief be correct QI more likely true 
Under the~ standard, appellant's gym shoes were 
incrirni na ting the moment that Farnsworth saw them. Farnsworth 
had followed tracks made by gym shoes to appellant 1 s house. He 
had reasonable grounds to believe that shoes were in appellant's 
house. Upon entering the bedroom, it was apparent that the shoes 
were gym shoes. These facts warrant a man of reasonable caution 
to believe that the shoes would be useful evidence of the crime. 
Farnsworth's suspicion did not have to be correct; it did not 
even have to be more likely true than false. Farnsworth' s 
suspicion need only have been reasonr1tle, which indeed it was. 
The seizure of the shoes was therefore valid under the plain view 
exception. 
B. THE APPELLANT'S SHOES WERE NOT 
SEIZED INCIDENT TO A WARRANTLESS SEARCH. 
The cornerstone of appellant's argument in Point I is 
th21 his shoes were seized during a warrantless search. 
Respondent has shown that the Court can find that the shoes were 
legally seized under the plain view exception. However, this 
Court can find that Officer Farnsworth's acticns did not 
constitute a s"arcl• e.nc1 tr.at no warrantless se<: rch or seizt:re 
occurred respecting the shoes. A search, warrantless or 
'theruise, requires that an officer undertake some affirmative 
ctior. to c;c.ther evidence "to 'search' is to look into or ov.,-r 
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carefully and thoroughly in an effort to find or discover." 
~~-Y~-E~~Y~IIi~1.a... Utah, 621 P.2d 709, 710 (1980).In the 
present case, a search, as defined in EJ::~Y.a.tii~, ~~..i:..a, did 
not occur. The appellant consented to Officer Farnsworth's 
presence in his home. Farnsworth followed appellant into his 
bedroom where he --Farnsworth-- had a legal right to be. Then, 
in response to Farnsworth's question, appellant voluntarily 
indicated the shoes he had worn. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the 
reception of voluntarily produced evidence is not a search and 
seizure • .COQli~_Yi_N~_l.laID~~bi~, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). In 
.CO.Qli~, ..s..u..,z~, the defendant's wife voluntarily gave over 
defendant's clothing and weapons to the police. The Court held 
that no search had occurred even though the surrender of evidence 
took place at defendant's home and his wife had been told that 
defendant was in trouble. 803 U.S. at 486, 489. 
In SUl1&_Yi~Y.e..s, Mont., 622 P.2d 203 (1981), the 
defendant was questioned by two uniformed patrol offricers who 
asked him if he had been in a fight at a local bar. The 
defendant responded that he had. The police then asked if he had 
used a knife. The defendant again answered yes and gave the 
knife to the police. The Montana Supreme court found that no 
search was involved. ~y.e,.s, 622 P.2d at 208. ~, ~. M.cG~ 
L_fila.1;&, Alaska, 614 P.2d 800 (1980) (surrender of a weapon 
treated as a plain view exception). The voluntary identification 
of the shoes by appellant to detective Farnsworth was similarly 
not a search. 
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Of course respondent's argument concerning the absence 
uf a search does not hold if appellant was compelled to point out 
the shoes. In the present case appellant was not subjected to 
any undue coercion. Farnsworth was the only officer in view when 
he knocked on appellant's door. After receiving permission to 
enter, Farnsworth asked short, concise questions of an 
investigative nature. When appellant identified the shoes, 
Farnsworth was still the sole officer in the bedroom. There may 
be a certain amount of coercion when one is confronted by a 
police officer, but this in itself does not result in a coercive 
surrender of evidence • .G.ray_e.s, .l>.Ull..LJlr at 207. Therefore, the 
admission into evidence of the shoes was proper, and the other 
i terns seized by the off ice rs are, th us, not subject to the fruit 
of the poisonous tree doctrine. HQn_g_S.IJlLYi_Dni.tf:.d...Stat~~. 371 
o. s. 471 (1963). 
B. SEIZURE OF THE PANTS. 
i. APPELLANT'S PANTS WERE PROPERLY 
SEIZ ED UNDER THE PLAIN VIEW EXCEPT ION. 
The case law and reasoning applied to the seizure of 
appellant's shoes also applies to the seizure of his pants. 
Officer Farnsworth had lawfully entered appellant's bedroom where 
the pants were in plain view, the pants were black and lay near 
appellant's bed, the only furniture in the room, obviously where 
he had undressed. This alone warranted Farnsworth's reasonable 
belief that the pants might be evidence of a crime. It was not 
necessary that he know that the pants QI shoes had blood stains 
of the victim's type on them in order to have that reasonable 
belief. 
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ii. THE SHOES AND PANTS WERE NOT 
SEIZED DURING A WARRANTLESS SEARCH. 
Respondent reiterates its position that appellant's 
shoes and pants were not seized pursuant to a search; instead 
they were voluntarily surrendered by appellant to detective 
Farnsworth in response to his noncoercive inquiries. As noted in 
Point I, the reception of voluntarily produced evidence is not a 
search. ~.Q..Qli~.g.e, 403 U.S. at 489. There was no coercion 
involved in Farnsworth's requests that appellant identify the 
clothing he wore that night. Furthennore, the only reasonable 
inference to be taken from Farnsworth's requests is that he 
wished to detennine if the clothing was evidence. Therefore, 
appellant's identification of the clothing was voluntary and 
knowing. 
C. THE GLOVES. 
i. THE SEIZURE OF THE GLOVES WAS 
JUSTIFIABLE UNDER EXIGENT 
CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPI'IOO TO THE 
WARRANT REQUIREMENT AND THE PLAIN 
VIEW EXCEPI'IONS. 
Before leaving with appellant, the officers conducted a 
short walkthrough of the rest of the house after receiving 
appellant's permission to do so CR. 452-53). The purpose of the 
walkthrough was to detennine if anyone else was in the house CR. 
421, 453). While looking in the bathroom, the officers saw a 
pair of gloves in plain view with "specks" on them. Farnsworth 
seized the gloves after asking appellant if he had worn them that 
night. 
The validity of "protective sweeps" like that in the 
present case has been upheld. In Dnite.!LStates_y~_Bii.d.Ql~, 436 
F.2d 4 (8th Cir. 1970), .c.e.i::.t.... .lieni~. 401 u. s. 921 Cl97ll, after 
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arresting defendant, officers fanned out to make a quick search 
of his apartment to see if there were others who might present 
dangers to the officers. The officers discovered a shotgun which 
was admitted into evidence. The appellate court upheld the 
3Q!n.ission of the shotgun: 
ld .. at 7. 
The distinguishing and controlling fact, 
as we view the case before us, is that 
the shotgun was not discovered as a result 
of any search whatsoever. Rather, it was 
discovered by being in plain view in the 
bedroom which Special Agent Hancock entered 
in the exercise of his conceded right to 
conduct a quick and cursory viewing of 
the apartment area for the presence of other 
persons who might present a security risk. 
1974), a quick search of a hotel room incident to arrest revealed 
heroin in the bathroom. The seizure of the heroin was upheld as 
a plain view discovery incident to a protective sweep. .O.emon.s, 
503 F. 2d at 488. 
The court in ~.e.d_.s_t~~YA~~it.Q, 620 F.2d 324, 
327-28 (2d Cir. 1980), .Q.eZ~A Jienie~. 449 U.S. 834 Cl980l approved 
of the protective sweep concept and called it a modest intrusion: 
The reasonableness of a security check 
is simple and straightforward. From the 
standpoint of the individual, the intrusion 
on his privacy is slight, the search is 
cursory in nature and is intended to uncover 
only "persons, not things.• Once the security 
check has been completed and the premises 
secured, no further search--be it extended 
or limited--is permitted until a warrant is 
obtained. From the standpoint of the public, 
its interest in a security check is weighty. 
The delay attendant upon obtaining a warrant 
could enable accomplices lurking in another 
room to destroy evidence. More important, 
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the safety of the arresting officers or 
members of the public may be jeopardized. 
Weighing the public interest against the 
modest intrusion on the privacy of the 
individual, a security check conducted 
under the circumstances stated above 
satisfies the reasonableness requirement 
of the Fourth Amendment. 
l.d.. at 336 (citations omitted). 
The protective sweep conducted in ~~it~ was .D.QI 
upheld for two reasons: the arrest was made .Q.Jlt~i~ the hotel 
room and there were no exigent circumstances. There were no 
exigent circumstances because the officers had the room under 
close surveillance for two days and .kne~ that no one was in the 
room. Ag.QJ;>i~ • .s.up~, at 336. 
Finally, in lln.it~~-SI~~~-Y~_.Y.as>;J~.ez, 638 F.2d 507 (2d 
Cir. 1980), ~I~ ~nie..Q, 454 o.s. 975 (1981), the court approved 
a security sweep incident to arrest as a " •• minimal 
additional intrusion of a quick check through the home to detect 
the presence of others who might attack the arresting officer or 
destroy evidence." Y.a.sg~, 638 F.2d at 530. 
In the present case, officers conducted a quick 
protective sweep, after arresting appellant. They did so in 
order to protect themselves and any evidence which might be 
injured or removed by others. Exigent circumstances existed 
because the officers had no knowledge of whether anyone else was 
in the home or not. During the sweep, an officer noticed the 
gloves in plain view on the bathroom floor. He also noticed that 
they had "dark specks" on them. Onder ~.xa~-Y~_EI~n, ~I~. it 
was reasonable for the officer to believe that the gloves might 
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be useful evidence. Nevertheless, the gloves were not removed 
until Detective Farnsworth asked appellant, who had already 
waived his HiI.ail® rights ("I want to level with you guys") if 
appellant had worn them that night. The appellant answered that 
he had. The answer was not coerced or the result of extended 
questioning or trickery on Farnsworth's part. Only at that time 
did Farnsworth seize the gloves. Appellant contends that the 
officers used the protective sweep doctrine as a "pretext" for 
gathering incriminating evidence. The facts simply do not 
support this claim. Given the circumstances, the district court 
did not abuse its discretion or clearly err in admitting the 
gloves into evidence. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S STATEMENTS MADE BEFORE HE 
HE WAS READ HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS WERE 
PROBABLY ADMITTED BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT 
THE RESULT OF A CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION. 
Mi~n.iia_y.£-AJ.:jz~.o.a, 384 U.S. 436 <1966), holds that an 
individual held for interrogation must be informed of his 
constitutional right to remain silent. The Mi.tzin® rule is 
triggered when a suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation, 
which is defined as taking a person into custody or otherwise 
depriving him of his freedom of action in any significant way. 
Mir.an~, 384 U.S. at 444. Appellant claims that he was so 
deprived at the moment Detective Farnsworth entered his 
residence. Thus appellant's claim focuses on the aspect of 
custody and llilt interrogation. This claim is not justifiable 
under Utah or Federal case law. 
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The factors involved in determining custodial interro-
gation are set forth in ~.al~_LaKe_.ci~_y_._C.aJ:~, Otah, 664 P.2d 
1168 Cl983l. They are: • Cll the site of the interrogation; ( 2) 
whether the investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether the 
objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the length and 
form of the interrogation. ~.a.I~, .sJlJ;/Za, at 1171. None of 
these factors singly, short of an arrest, is sufficient in itself 
to require a 15.izanda warning. Thus in ~Le~Q~y .. _.Ma~.hia~QD, 429 
o.s. 492 (1976), the Court said that the fact that questioning 
took place in a police station or that the questioned one is the 
person whom the police suspect will not automatically mandate a 
15.iz.an.illl warning • .Ma~a~D, 429 o.s. at 495. Furthermore, the 
test is an objective one. Neither the officer's nor the 
appellant's subjective state of mind is a standard for 
determining deprivation of freedom of movement. .B.Q~Q.Q.i~_y_. 
DQ.l.l.g.ani~, 592 F.2d 1202, 1205-6 (1979); l'.e~le-Y.._JQhn~QD, Colo., 
671 P.2d 958, 961 (1983). This objective standard is consistent 
with United States Supreme Court constructions of "seizure" for 
Fourth Amendment purposes. ~n~.!LS.t.ate~_y_._..Men~enball, 446 u.s. 
544, 554 Cl980l; ~ee .al..s.o, liazin.g._yi_~~ate, Alaska, 670 P.2d 357, 
361 Cl983l. Nor does the mere presence of an officer constitute 
a show of authority. !ti/.mez_y_._.T.l.lL~, 672 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 
1982) • 
Appellant cites a number of cases dealing with 
interrogation at a defendant's residence, which he says support 
his cl aim that he was in custody from the moment Farnsworth 
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entered his house. The cases cited by appellant do not apply to 
the present situation. 
In E~D~l~_y~ Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d 515 58 
cal. Rptr. 115 (1967), the defendant was .tJll~ to come to the 
di=trict attorney's office and, upon his arrival, he was 
questioned for an hour and forty-five minutes. The defendant 
then gave a statement at the conclusion of the interrogation. 
All of the preceding occurred without defendant being given a 
MiI~n.da warning. ~. 58 Cal. Rptr. at 118. 
In QIDZ~~-Y~-x~~. 394 o.s. 324 Cl969l, the defendant 
was questioned at his apartment in the early morning. However, 
any resemblance to the present case stops at this point. First, 
Orozco did not admit the police to his apartment, an unidentified 
woman did. Second, there were four officers in Orozco's 
apartment at all times. Third, the officers testified that 
QI~~~~ was under arrest during questioning. Fourth, the officers 
immediately asked Orozco if he had been at the scene of the 
crirne--a murder--and if Orozco owned a pistol. Orozco admitted 
to owning a weapon and told its location. Orozco's gun was 
proved to be the murder weapon. Both of the incriminating 
questions were asked under coercive conditions before Orozco 
received a lilI~~ warning. QI~z.s;D, 394 o.s. at 325. 
Similarly, in .B.o~i~Ii~_.iu__~~. 391 F.2d 869 C9th Cir. 
1968), a forgery case, the civil commissioner asked the defendant 
the ultimate question, did you forge the check. After the 
question was repeated the defendant answered yes. .B.o~~.iD, 391 
F.2d at 871. The court, in finding a~~ violation, noted 
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that defendant's testimony was extremely prejudicial. 1.d... at 
872. 
In ,E.e_opl.e _ _y...__Gl.Qy.e..i:' 3 2 Mi SC. 2d 52 0, 27 6 N. y. s. 2d 461 
119661, the court focused exclusively on the officer's subjective 
intent that defendant was arrested. From this the court 
determined that since suspicion was focused on the accused, he 
was subjected to custodial interrogation. _Gl_Qy.e..i:, 276 N.Y.S. 2d 
at 466. This standard no longer complies with federal case law. 
_Q_r_e~.o._y_._Mg_tbi.a.sQ.D, .SJJPil, .B~Q.Q.iM_y_._DQJJZ9Dll, .SJJPil. 
Appellant cites other cases which state that being the 
focus of an investigation is a critical factor in determining 
whether the accused was subjected to custodial interrogation. 
Appellant also cites cases dealing with the presence of probable 
cause to arrest. Both sets of cases center around the concept of 
the focus of the investigation and will be discussed together. 
Hin.Oi>QI_y .... _Dni_t~_d_Stat.e_s, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968) 
is an example of the focus of investigation as a crucial factor 
in giving a MiI.an.cia warning. In H_ind_s_o_r, .sJJPilr a co-defendant 
had given sufficient evidence including identification of the 
defendant to focus suspicion specifically on the defendant and 
during questioning the defendant gave a confession. Hin.dsQI, 389 
F.2d at 531-32. Thus, there was enough evidence to give the 
officers probable cause to arrest defendant. Under those 
circumstances, a !UI.an.cia warning should have been given. 
Hin.dsQI, J~~-£ .... 2d, at 534. 
Another case cited by appellant, _s_ta_t_e _ _y__. Kenneey, 166 
Ariz. 566, 570 P.2d 508 (19771, also talks about focus of 
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suspicion in terms of probable cause to arrest. In Kil~, 
probable cause to arrest was a factor in determining the 
necessity for a M.i.L~ warning, but did not in itself trigger 
,_he need for a .Minn.da warning. .Kilnlle.dy, 570 P.2d at 510. 
Both .s..ta.t.e_y_.__.MeJmi.e.J:, 137 Vt. 586, 409 A.2d 583 (1979) 
and .S_p.e<l.I.S_Y~_S.ta.t.e, 383 N. E. 2d 282 (Ind. 197 8), talk about 
footprints and probable cause but they are not directly 
applicable to the present case. .MeJmi.eI deals with a warrantless 
seizure of evidence incident to arrest. .MeJmi.e.J:, 409 A.2d at 
584-85. In .S_p.ea..r.s, ~_ra, the officers also had name 
identific'ation of the defendant, based upon a card of defendant's 
parole officer found in defendant's clothing. 
Thus the cases cited by appellant do not support his 
claim that he was in custody and subjected to interrogation. 
Those cases dealing with questioning at a defendant's residence 
involve fact situations radically different from the present 
case, usually culminating in a highly incriminating confession. 
The cases dealing with focus of suspicion require a much higher 
degree of focus than exists in the present case, usually 
involving identification of a specific suspect by another--
l:liruis..QI, .sJJL.JU, or the presence of other evidence which 
specifically focuses the investigation on the accused--S~aI~, 
The single Utah case cited by appellant, _sts_t.e_y~ 
W.g.Q, 24 Utah 430, 473 P.2d 895 (1970), also requires •specific 
accusations directed specifically toward one person •• 
before a .Miran.da warning is required. L.a.l:9.Q, 473 P.2d at 896. 
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Although no M.iI.a.n.da violation was found, .LaJ;.go, ..s.u~u, also 
centered around the admissibility of a confession given by the 
defendant. 
The Onited States Supreme Court discussed the 
importance of the focus of the investigation in determining the 
custodial natureof interrogation in B~~.b.>i1h...Y~-~.nit~~-~.t.at.e..s, 
425 o.s. 341 (1976). The Court reiterated its adherence to the 
principle that the custodial nature of the interrogation creates 
the necessity for a ltiI~n.da warning. B~~t~itb, 425 U.S. at 346. 
Furthermore, the coercive aspect of the situation as determined 
by its nature and setting determines whether the questioning was 
custodial . .Li.. The fact that the "focus" of an investigation is 
upon a suspect because his activities are under scrutiny does not 
create a custodial situation and the resulting necessity for a 
lti~n~ warning. B~~t~itb, ~~. at 347. 
Given the above law, the circumstances in the present 
case do not show that appellant was subjected to custodial 
interrogation from the moment Farnsworth received permission to 
enter his residence. The questioning did take place at an early 
hour in appellant's residence, but entry was gained through 
appellant's consent. Only one officer was present in the house 
before the appellant entered his bedroom. Nor were any of the 
objective indicia of arrest present. Appellant was not told that 
he was under arrest nor was he presented with any show of 
authority which would indicate arrest. There is no record of 
guns being drawn or threatening statements being made. Detective 
Farnsworth did testify that he would not have left appellant's 
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home if requested, but the request was never made and Farnswroth 
never communicated this intent to appellant. Therefore 
Farnsworth intention to remain was totally subjective and n.Q.t 
part of the objective indicia of coercion or arrest associated 
with custodial interrogation. B~~.di.ne_y_.._l)~~~ni.s, lWPLll• 
unite.d__S~~~e.s_y~_.Men~enha.J.1, .s..JJPL~· Furthermore, the time 
between consent to entry and the reading of the Mi.ta.nlia warning 
was short and the questions asked were generally investigatory in 
nature. 
Farnsworth's last question before reading appellant his 
Jtirallilil rights was "have you killed or assaulted anyone?" The 
asking of this question alone does not create a ~nlia violation 
because the appellant was not in custody when the question was 
asked • .E.Jll)~_l.sl.an.Q_y_..__l.nni.s, 446 U.S. 291, 300-1 (1980). Also, 
it is significant that appellant made no incriminating statements 
until .af~.e..r he had been given the MiL.AD.da warnings. ..st~~jLL. 
Jitlnb.a.i:~, Utah, 617 P.2d 355, 357 !1980). 
Finally, the investigation had not !~~~ on the 
appellant as defined in Becis~i~h, L.a.i;9~, or .Me~ieL, .sJ.JPL~· 
Appellant had not been identified by eyewitnesses as the specific 
individual who committed the crime, nor was there other evidence 
that specifically linked appellant to the crime such as 
fingerprints or other identifying evidence left at the scene of 
the crime. Appellant, in analyzing the facts, concentrates on 
the officer's subjective intent not to leave appellant's 
residence if requested to do so. This fact is of no consequence, 
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since it was never communicated to appellant and cannot form the 
basis of any objective indicia of arrest. ~~, .s.up.r_a. 
certainly, the officer investigating the crime was 
concerned with finding additional evidence leading to an arrest. 
There are no other reasonable grounds for an investigation. 
However, a reasonable suspicion that the shoes responsible for 
the footprints were in the house does not provide probable cause 
as claimed by appellant. Until Detective Farnsworth determined 
that the shoes were in the house and that they belonged to 
appellant, no probable cause to arrest existed. It would be 
unreasonable to assume that appellant owned the shoes when 
Farnsworth did not know if anyone else either resided at the 
house or was visiting at the time. 
In conclusion, until the time that a .MiI~D~ warning 
was given, there were insufficient indicia that appellant was 
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, either 
through physical coercion or an overt assertion of police 
authority. Therefore, the trial court properly refused to 
suppress appellant's statements made prior to the .MiI~D~ 
warning. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT'S POST-ID.BllHDA STATEMENTS WERE 
PROPERLY ADMITTED BEC'AUSE APPELLANT 
INITIALLY FAILED TO AFFIRMATIVELY INVOKE 
THOSE RIGHTS AND THEN VOLUNTEERED 
STATEMENTS WHILE NOT UNDER INTERROGATION. 
A valid waiver of .MiI~ rights must be voluntary and 
also be based upon a knowing, intelligent understanding of those 
rights • .JQhnsQD-3'~_-Z.f:I~.aj;, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1968); .s.t~~-~ 
~~l~m, 671 F.2d 1150, 1157 (8th Cir. 1982>. 
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Silence is not sufficient to establish waiver, but 
silence, coupled with an understanding of the rights and a 
particular course of conduct may constitute waiver. ~ 
CaLOlina_y_._B.ll.tl~Lr 441 U.S. 369 Cl979li Dnit~.d....Sta.tf:..s_y_._Eg~,k.ey, 
r,J6 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Furthermore, a suspect must in 
some manner affirmatively invoke his right to silence or counsel, 
.Mi~n.da._y.__Ari.z~na. 384 u.s. 436, 473 Cl965li llD.it.e..cLStat~~-Y ... 
Jl.Oili• 675 F.2d 1174, 1182 n.13 (llth Cir. 1982). The court must 
look at the totality of the circumstances to determine if a valid 
waiver has been made • ..F.ai:~_y_._.Mi.cb.a.el_~ ... , 442 U.S. 707, 725 
(1979). This involves an evaluation of the suspect's native 
intelligence and educational level, his experience with the 
criminal justice system, the manner in which the warnings were 
given, and the nature of any statement or action by the accused 
which potentially shows his understanding and waiver of his 
rights. ~_ar~, .sJJP..t..a1 l'.QlliY~L_Y ... _GgtbLi~, 501 F.Supp. 148. 
(E.D.Va. 1980) Finally, ~.d.a principles do not apply to 
volunteered statements of the accused made without interrogation. 
lliL~ruia. 384 U.S. at 478, ..s.tat~_y ... _.Jimjne..z, 22 Utah 2d 233, 451 
P.2d 583, 585 (1969) i filat~_y ... _S.c.an.fil~ltr 24 Utah 2d 202, 468 
P.2d 639, 642 n.5 (1970). The "[clourts should indulge every 
reasonable presumption against waiver• of fundamental 
constitutional rights.• filat~_y_._Meill.h.atlr Utah, 617 P.2d 355, 
357 (1980), .Q.JJ.Qtin~ .J..obD~D• .sJlP_UI, at 464. However, this court 
recognizing the advantageous position of the district courts, 
reverses a finding of waiver or voluntary admission only when 
that finding is clearly in error or the district court abused its 
discretion. ~inb.aJ:t, .sJJPL~· 
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In this case, the only evidence to support appellant's 
contention is that he did not expressly say that he wished to 
freely speak. 
In considering the totality of the circumstances, the 
evidence supports the state's contention that appellant's 
communications were voluntary. Appellant is a mature adult of 
above-average intelligence (I.Q. of 119) (R. 272). He is a high 
school graduate who, at the time of the crime was attending Utah 
Technical College. He had a prior conviction and was thus no 
novice in these matters. Indeed, while Farnsworth was reading 
appellant's rights from a .MiI~n.d.1 card, appellant interrupted him 
to say that he had heard his rights before and knew them. 
Farnsworth finished reading appellant his rights despite this. 
There can be no doubt that appellant was aware of his rights. 
When asked if he wished to answer any questions, 
appellant responded ft! don't know". Although this may not 
constitute an express waiver, neither does it communicate an 
affirmative intention by appellant to invoke his rights. Then 
Farnsworth asked appellant to give a yes or no answer to the 
question. This was only reasonable because Farnsworth could not 
otherwise be sure if appellant had invoked his rights or not. 
Appellant's reply ftwell, it depends" can be construed 
as •rt depends upon what questions you ask.ft Appellant, in 
essence, was selectively waiving his .!il..t.an.d.1 rights. His 
intention was to answer those questions that he wished and to 
leave others unanswered. Farnsworth then asked appellant two 
questions: had appellant been at the scene of the crime and what 
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other clothing had appellant worn. Appellant did not answer the 
first question, but readily pointed out the clothes he had worn. 
In .5..tg~~-Y.1_.Mo..r..ai.n.e, 25 Utah 2d 51, 475 P.2d 831, 832 
11970), the defendant robbed a store and accidentally shot 
n.i.mself. When the police found him, he was in great pain. The 
officer read him his rights and the defendant said he did not 
wish to talk. Then the officer asked him why he committed the 
robbery. The defendant's incriminating answer was admitted into 
evidence al though he claimed the state failed to affirmatively 
show that he waived his right to remain silent. This court 
stated: 
The fact that he made the statement after 
being warned is a clear indication that 
he waived any right, if any he had, to 
remain silent. 
Respondent contends the present case clearly comes 
within the scope of MQI.ai.n.e, ~~Ig,. In that case, the defendant 
was in great pain and had expressly said he did not wish to talk. 
In the present case the appellant was not suffering from either 
mental or physical pain and had expressed at best an ambivalent 
desire to selectively invoke his rights. Appellant's 
identification of his clothing was free and voluntary, under 
conditions that he had specified. In effect, appellant 
"indicated his disinclination to assert his known right to remain 
silent by freely and willingly answering the officer's question.• 
St.at~_Yi_.E.li;.c..i, Utah, 655 P.2d 690, 692 (1982). 
At this point, after gathering the clothes that 
appellant had indicated, Farnsworth told him that he would have 
to accompany the officers to the station. Almost immediately 
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thereafter appellant said "I want to level with you guys. I do 
know somebody at that house you talking about" (R. 4201). This 
statement was voluntary, it occurred within one and a half 
minutes after his MiillD.da rights were read and it was not in 
response to any question by an officer. From here, the 
conversation between appellant and Detective Farnsworth was a 
free dialogue devoid of any coercion or indices of interrogation. 
Indeed, appellant's quoted statement would be admissible in court 
without a M.i~.da warning and certainly serves as a proper waiver 
of Mi~n.da rights after a warning. M.i~~Jl, 384 U.S. at 478. 
POINT IV 
THE STATEMENTS MADE AND EVIDENCE SEIZED SHOULD 
NOT BE SUPPRESSED UNDER THE FRUITS OF THE 
POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE. 
Appellant claims that all evidence seized and 
statements he made resulted from alleged unlawful acts of the 
police in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Without 
reciting all of the arguments made in the previous three points, 
respondent asserts that this is not the case. 
Appellant was properly informed of his .M.iiiiD.da rights. 
He freely chose to waive those rights, first by agreeing to 
answer questions selectively ("I don't know. It depends."), and 
second, by agreeing to "level" with the officers. This last full 
waiver was volunteered within a minute and a half after appellant 
was informed of his rights and indicated his understanding of 
them. 
Appellant voluntarily identified his shoes, pants and 
gloves. No coercion was involved. Under ~QQli~~-Y~-N~~ 
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Ham.P~bi.Le• .sJJ~~· the shoes and pants were not the product of a 
seizure; they were evidence voluntarily surrendered by appellant 
1 n Detective Farnsworth. The gloves were discovered in plain 
"iew during a lawful protective sweep search of appellant's 
house. None of this evidence is subject to the exclusionary 
rule. 
Appellant attempts to apply the poisonous tree 
doctrine, b'Qo.g._.SJJlLY ... _JJoi.ted_.S.ta.t~.s, 371 u. s. 471 Cl963J, to 
statements made by appellant while he was being transported to 
[he police station. That doctrine is not applicable here because 
appellant had already given a full waiver of his .Mi..u.olia rights 
before he entered the police car. Furthermore, statements by 
appellant while in the car that were admitted at trial were not 
the product of interrogation; they were either assertions made or 
questions asked by appellant without Detective Farnsworth' s 
prompting. Finally, appellant cl aims that evidence seized under 
the search warrants must be suppressed because the probable cause 
statement was based upon the allegedly illegally seized shoes. 
Respondent has already demonstrated in Point I that the shoes 
were either not seized at all, or were properly seized under the 
plain view exception. 
Furthermore, appellant overlooks the fact that the 
probable cause statements also list footprints leading from the 
scene of the crime, the valid plain view discovery of the coat 
closely matching that worn by the suspect, and the fact that 
appellant was sole occupant of the house. These facts alone, 
without the shoes would give a cautious mind reasonable suspicion 
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to believe that useful evidence was in the house. Such a 
reasonable suspicion would be sufficient probable cause for 
issuance of a search warrant. .Dnit~~-SI~t~~-Y~-.b'~~.ng, 703 
F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1983). The warrants in the present case 
are still valid even assuming, arguendo, that the shoes were 
improperly used as probable cause. Nor does the alleged fact 
that the officers did not correctly state the grounds for the 
search if, from an objective viewpoint, probable cause existed. 
405 U.S. 926 (1972). The above holds true even if the officers 
acted in bad faith, a claim that appellant does not make. Dl.ai..! 
y~_Unit~.d....Stat~~. 665 F.2d, 500, 506 (1981). The issuance of the 
search warrants in the present case was lawful, even granting 
appellant's spurious claim that the shoes could not serve as 
grounds for probable cause. Thus under any argument the evidence 
seized under the search warrants is not subject to the fruit of 
the poisonous tree doctrine. .b'~n~_S.un_y~-~n.it~.d....Siat~, ~~~..ui. 
POINT V 
EVIDENCE SEIZED UNDER THE WARRANTS IS 
EITHER AI»IISSIBLE OR ITS AI»\ISSION 
AT TRIAL WAS HARMLESS ERROR. 
A. THE ALLEGED ILLEGAL ENTRY AND SEIZ URE 
OF APPELLANT'S HOME BY OFFICER BERNARDS 
DOES NOT AFFECT THE AI»\ISSIBILITY OF 
EVIDENCE OBTAINED UNDER THE SEARCH WARRANTS. 
The crux of appellant's theory in Point VI of his brief 
is that the "impoundment" of his home by Officer Barnards was an 
illegal seizure of that home and all of its contents which could 
not be cured by issuance of valid search warrants. The cases 
cited for this principle by appellant, while valid law, are more 
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restrictive than recent Onited States Supreme Court cases and 
should not be adopted by this jurisdiction. 
In M..iru;ey_y ... _Ariz~.ng, 437 o.s. 385 (1978), the court 
reviewed a situation where a police guard was placed at the 
";,trance of a residence to preserve the ~.t.IUI .llJ.lQ while a search 
warrant was being sought. The Court approved this procedure even 
though "[TJhere was no indication that evidence would be lost, 
destroyed, or removed during the time required to obtain a search 
warrant" Miru;ey, J.JL!L....S ... at 394. 
In .B.a~lin.g~_y ... _.Kiln.t.w:;~, 448 O.S. 98 (1980), officers 
secured the home from within of a person for whom they had a 
valid arrest warrant. The officers detained .all of the home's 
occupants while a search warrant was being obtained. The Court 
did not question the admissibility of evidence seized under the 
warrants. ~li~, .sJJ~.i,:g, at 106-10. 
Finally, in ,Si:~.a_y ... _.Dni.te.d...S.t.a.te~, __ u. s. ___ , 
104 s.ct. 3380 (1984), the Court found that the illegality of an 
initial entry and securing of a house from within has no effect 
upon the validity of a subsequent search based on a valid search 
warrant. .Se.glll.a, 104 s.ct. at 3382-83. 
In .s..e.gu.i,:g, ~.i,:g, narcotics agents arrested the 
defendant under a valid warrant in the lobby of his apartment 
building. They then took defendant upstairs to his apartment 
where they were met by a third person. The agents entered the 
apartment without receiving or requesting permission. The agents 
~nducted a limited security sweep of the apartment to insure 
that no one else was there who might destroy evidence. In the 
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process the agents discovered useful evidence in plain view, but 
disturbed none of it. Two agents remained behind in the 
defendant's apartment awaiting a warrant which was issued 19 
hours after the agents' initial entry. Sesu~~ 104 S.Ct. at 3384. 
Numerous items were seized pursuant to the warrant. 
The defendant claimed that all evidence seized under 
the warrant was tainted by the illegal initial entry and 
therefore should be suppressed. The Court accepted the lower 
court's determination that the entry was illegal, but said that 
the illegality of this entry did not affect the validity of the 
seizures under the warrants as long as the warrant was based on 
validity obtained probable cause. ~~~~. 104 s.ct. at 3389-980. 
In the present case, appellant does not contest the 
validity of Detective Farnsworth's entry. That entry, appellant 
concedes, was based upon appellant's consent. Furthermore, 
probable cause for the search warrants was based upon information 
legally obtained by Farnsworth; e.g., the prints noticed before 
the entry, and the coat and shoes legally viewed after the entry. 
All of this information was gained prior to or independently of 
Officers Martin's and Bernard's entry and the subsequent securing 
of appellant's home. The warrants were there based on legally 
obtained probable cause untainted by the complained of police 
actions. Under ~. ~~~..r_g, that evidence is admissible and 
not subject to the exclusionary rule. 
The subsequent entry by the video tape technician is of 
no consequence in the present dispute. No evidence was 
disturbed, and tapes were made only of the front room and the 
bedroom of appellant's home. The only reasonable purpose for 
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these tapes was to verify the location of evidence in appellant• s 
house which might later be seized. The suppression of these 
tapes would be of no consequence because testimony at the 
suppression hearing verified that all evidence was s"eized from 
appellant's home. 
Considering all of the above, the evidence seized under 
the warrants was admissible. 
B. ASSUMING THE EVIDENCE GATHERED UNDER THE 
SEARCH WARRANTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, 
IT WAS CUMULATIVE AND ITS SUPPRESSION WOULD 
HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE. 
Appellant claims that evidence gathered under the 
search warrants must be suppressed because that evidence was 
already illegally seized when Officer Bernard remained on the 
premises after appellant was taken to the police station. 
Granting, ~nJ:lQ, appellant's claim, the suppression of the 
evidence gathered pursuant to the warrants would not result in 
reversal because that evidence was merely cumulative in effect. 
Only one item of evidence seized pursuant to the 
warrants was introduced at trial; a shoelace covered with blood. 
Roy Tubergen, an F. B. I. expert on examining physical evidence for 
blood, determined that the blood on the shoelace was the same 
type as the victim's. However, Tubergen also located blood on 
the back of appellant's parka, on the cuff of his pants and on 
the instep of his right tennis shoe. The blood on the parka and 
the pants was consistent with the victim's blood. As has been 
shown, the parka, pants, and shoes were all lawfully obtained by 
the police by either voluntary surrender or warrantless seizure. 
Linder these facts, the blood discovered on appellant's shoelace 
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is merely cumulative evidence and adds nothing new or of 
importance to the state's case. Furthermore, the other evidence 
is more than sufficient to support appellant's conviction ~~ 
.s.tat~_Yi_Giiffin, Utah, 626 P.2d 478 (1981J. Therefore, since 
appellant's substantial rights were .D.Q1 affected by admission of 
the shoelace, the error, if any, should be disregarded. Rule 30, 
Utah Rules of Crim. Procedure. 
POINT VI 
THE SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE NOT LISTED IN THE 
SEARCH WARRANT HAS NO EFFECT UPON APPELLANT'S 
TRIAL BECAUSE THIS EVIDENCE WAS NOT 
INTRODUCED AT TRIAL. 
Appellant complains of the seizure of certain items, 
specifically various purses, a toilet token, a red nipple stuffed 
with cotton, a bed sheet, a bed cover, a blue and white sweater, 
a red scarf with a knot and miscellaneous papers. Appellant 
presents a well reasoned argument citing many cases. Assuming 
the validity of this argument, it is unclear what the purpose of 
appellant's claim is, since none of the evidence complained of 
was introduced at trial. The only item introduced at trial and 
seized pursuant to the warrant was a shoelace. This shoelace was 
specifically mentioned in the affidavit for the warrant and in 
the warrant itself. 
Appellant also notes that the wrong address appears on 
one warrant and that the correction gives no indication of when 
or by whom it was made. It should also be noted that there is no 
indication of who made the initial error in the address. 
However, the affidavit for the warrant does contain appellant's 
correct address. The mistaken address appears in the probable 
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cause statement at the end of the affidavit. It is apparent that 
the individual responsible for writing the affidavit Detective 
Abbott was aware of the correct address. 
A description in a warrant of a place to be searched is 
.. onsti tutionally adequate if the officer executing the warrant 
can locate the place to be searched with reasonable effort. 
A wrong address on the warrant will not in itself 
invalidate a warrant if an officer, through personal knowledge of 
the premise's address, is able to locate it • .stai~_Yi_ll.Q~, 18 
wash. App. 740, 573 P.2d 1325 (1977) • ..s..e~ .al~~ ~A~~-Yi_All~I~ll~, 
592 F.2d 1339, 1344 (5th Cir. 1979). In the present case, 
Detective Abbott wrote the affidavit containing the correct 
address and executed the warrant. (Suppression hearing 
transcript 459). He therefore had sufficient personal knowledge 
to locate appellant's house with reasonable effort. 
Finally, appellant claims that the warrants were based 
on illegally seized articles. Respondent has previously 
demonstrated the error in this allegation. Nor is there 
anything in the affidavits from which the magistrate would 
necessarily infer that the articles were still in appellant's 
house. 
Before a hearing reviewing the accuracy of an affidavit 
is required, appellant must make a "substantial preliminary 
showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or 
with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the 
affiaint in the warrant affidavit.• .F..r.aD.Jt.~LYi-~.ll.Ur 438 U.S. 
154, 155 (1978). Under .F..r~.lu;, ~I~, appellant's challenge to 
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the facial adequacy of the affidavit in the present case fails on 
several grounds. First, appellant has failed to show from the 
record that there was any intentional, knowing or reckless 
disregard of the truth by the aff iant. Secondly none of the 
statements in the affidavit are false. Appellant's claims that 
the facts upon wichh the affidavit is based are either misleading 
or concl usory is itself con cl usory and with out supper t. The 
claim should be disregarded. 
POINT VII 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL TO DISMISS FOR 
FAILURE TO HOLD THE PRELIMINARY HEARING 
WITHIN TEN DAYS WAS BASED ON GOOD CAUSE 
SHOWN. MOREOVER, ASSUMING .ARG!J.fill.DQ, THAT 
THERE WAS ERROR, APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED 
TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED. 
Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion on April 5, 
1982, to dismiss the information based upon an alleged violation 
of his rights as expressed in Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-7(cl (Supp. 
1981). This motion was denied. Appellant renewed the motion in 
District Court on December 7, 1982. The District Court, in 
denying the motion noted that the matter had already been ruled 
on by the Circuit Court and that it, the District Court, was not 
in a position to review that ruling (R. 363). In both the 
motions and the present appeal, appellant claims in essence that 
his statutory and constitutional right to a speedy trial was 
violated when the preliminary hearing was postponed, supposedly 
without good cause shown. 
Two continuances were granted. The first was set for 
March 5, 1982. At that time the State moved to continue because 
evidence sent to the F.B.I. for analysis had not been returned 
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and the State needed the evidence in order to proceed with the 
hearing. Judge Gowans granted the motion and set the hearing for 
March 24, saying that this was good cause CR. 359). On March 23, 
Judge Jones' clerk reported that the judge had been assigned the 
hearing, that he was unavailable to hear the case the next day 
and that the hearing was continued on the Court's order until 
April 5 (R. 360). At that preliminary hearing the judge 
addressed the question of cause for the extension. He stated 
that unavailability of a judge for the hearing was good cause and 
that the continuance was properly granted CR. 3601. 
Notably, appellant stated at the District Court hearing 
that the State could refile if the information was dismissed CR. 
362). Yet, on the present appeal, appellant asks for reversal of 
the judgment and dismissal of charges. 
The continuances were indeed granted for good cause. 
The first continuance was granted because vital evidence was 
still in the F.B.I. 's possession. The absence of a material 
witness, where the State is not at fault, has been ruled good 
cause . ..s.ta1~_y_._~QQ.dm.ill~, 86 Idaho 233, 386 P.2d 365 (1963). 
A delay occasioned by the State's awaiting a laboratory report on 
evidence has been ruled good cause. ~~-y ... _An.Q~, 29 Conn. 
Sup. 193, 218 A.2d 151 (1971). 
In M.oI1Q.n..._y_._~.upI.eiD.e~~~. 411 P.2d 170 (Arizona 
1966), a case cited by appellant, unavailablity of a judge to 
preside over a preliminary hearing was said to be good cause for 
a continuance. R.oitQD, 411 P.2d at 173. In ~tat~_yA__.!l.QQI~• 
Utah, 521 P.2d 556 (1974), the decision granting continuance was 
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reversed because the State made no attempt to show good cause. 
Rather the State attempted to avoid making the showing by 
dismissing the complaint and then refiling. The State attempted 
no such subterfuge in the present case. Instead both 
continuances were based upon findings of good cause. Those 
findings should not be reversed unless the lower courts abused 
their discretion, a fact clearly not evident in the present case. 
2~~~Yi_L~.dYitsa, 15 Cal. 3d 481, 87 Cal. Rptr. 182 Cl97ll. 
Even if the alleged error did occur, it would not be 
grounds for reversal of the trial court's judgment. Appellant 
admits that dismissal of the Information at the pretrial level 
would not have resulted in prejudice against the State. Refiling 
would always be a possibility and logically would have occurred 
in a case such as the present one. It follows that errors at the 
pretrial level which would not irreversibly deny the trial court 
jurisdiction should not be grounds for reversal of an otherwise 
valid conviction. 
The Onited States Supreme Court has addressed this 
issue in a similar setting--a purported lack of jurisdiction to 
tray a plaintiff who has been arrested on a warrant issued 
without adequate probable cause. In ~~zst~in_Yi_E~.gb, 420 o.s. 
103, 119 (1974), the Court said that it is an "established rule 
that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent 
conviction." The Court reaffirmed that position in .s.t~ne_yi 
.E.Qw~ll, 428 o.s. 465, 485 (1976) and in Dnit~.d...Stat~S-Yi-~Z~l!i.S, 
445 o.s. 463, 478 (1979) (White, J. concurring). Like the 
dismissal of an arrest warrant, the dismissal of the Information 
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in the present case would not have put appellant forever beyond 
the court's jurisdiction. Also, it is notable that the Court in 
GeI~t.ein, 2~~..c_g, stated that illegal detentions do not void a 
subsequent conviction. The avoidance of illegal detentions is 
the crux of the right to a speedy trial or preliminary hearing. 
These are the rights that appellant claims the State violated. 
Furthermore, appellant has not shown, or even alleged that his 
right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the continuances. It has 
not been shown that the State gained an unfair advantage from or 
that appellant was disadvantaged by the continuances. Errors by a 
magistrate at a preliminary hearing are not grounds for reversal 
if an accused is afforded a proper trial unless such prejudice is 
shown • .sta.t.e_Y.&-~~~, 18 Utah 2d 153, 417 P.2d 655 (1966). 
Where, as in the present case, appellant has been properly 
convicted in an otherwise error free trial, it would be anomalous 
indeed if the judgment could be reversed for a supposed lack of 
good cause to continue a preliminary hearing. 
POINT VIII 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO FIND 
APPELLANT GUILTY OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER. 
A. THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES APPELLANT'S 
GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
This Court's ability to review a conviction on the 
sufficiency of the evidence is well established. .st.a.t.e_Y.& 
~.U.Uin, supra. In any event, the evidence and all 
favorable inferences in the present case is not merely sufficient 
tu sustain appellant's conviction~ it strongly mandates 
appellant's conviction. 
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At 3:00 a.m. on February 10, 1982, two people, 
Elizabeth Langford and Clark Campbell, awoke to a loud scream 
from the apartment directly above them. They both heard what 
sounded like a fight, followed by loud banging noises. One of 
the voices was full of fear. After fifteen minutes, the noise 
suddenly stopped. They then were able to trace the sound of 
footprints leaving the apartment above them, going downstairs 
towards the apartment house's front door. They both looked out 
their front window and saw the back of a man at a distance of 
eight feet. Obviously this man was the one who had been in the 
apartment above them, carla Taylor's apartment. The man paused 
long enough for Clark and Elizabeth to notice that he was dark 
and dressed in dark pants and wore a dark parka with a bright 
colored V-stripe on the back. 
Then the man headed east leaving footprints in the 
fresh snow along Sixth South, a direction that would lead him to 
appellant's residence. Two officers responded to a call by Clark 
Campbell. The first thing they noticed as they approached the 
apartment house was a single set of prints both entering and 
leaving the front of the apartment, prints left by the man whom 
Clark and Elizabeth had seen leaving the apartment house. The 
officers entered the apartment house and immediately proceeded to 
carla's second floor apartment. There they discovered her 
partially nude body, badly beaten, covered with multiple stab 
woulds, the murder weapon left in her chest and a toothbrush 
thrust into her vagina. They were the type of wounds and beating 
that would require a good fifteen minutes of violent effort to 
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inflict; a badly slashed lip, severe stab wounds on the shoulder 
and the fatal wound, entering the chest and penetrating the back. 
There was a print on the victim's neck, as if the murderer held 
ner down with his foot while inflicting many of the blows or 
.ihile attempting to disrobe her. 
Other officers arrived. They followed the footprints 
easily, quickly, to appellant's house. The pattern of the print 
was unique, obviously left by a gym shoe. Officer Farnsworth 
knocked on appellant's door after determining that the footprints 
terminated there. Farnsworth entered with appellant• s consent 
and immediately saw a coat matching the one seen by Clark and 
Elizabeth • The coat had blood on it matching the victim's, not 
appellant's. Whoever wore that coat had been at Carla Taylor's 
apartment. Appellant then indicated what shoes he had worn that 
night. They were gym shoes, with a tread matching that of the 
prints Farnsworth had followed and they were wet. Obviously 
appellant had been at Carla's apartment and, equally as obvious, 
he had been there recently. 
There was blood on the shoes and on dark pants 
appellant said he wore that night. The blood matched the 
victim's. It was easy to see how that blood might have got there 
as appellant placed his foot on the victim's body and inflicted a 
knife wound on her chest or upper body or, equally as reasonable, 
blood flowed across appellant's shoe from a fresh wound while he 
held the victim down, preventing any escape. 
Later, appellant admitted that he was at Carla Taylor's 
apartment house, but that he went to see Jerome Thornton who 
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lived across the hall from Carla. Appellant claimed that he was 
in the apartment house only long enough to ring Thornton's 
doorbell and then left when there was no answer. Thornton was 
home, however, and was awakened by screams from the victim's 
apartment. Furthermore, he never heard his doorbell. Thornton 
is a light sleeper and his doorbell is easily audible from his 
bedroom. Appellant was indeed at Thornton's apartment house, but 
he obviously made no attempt to see Thornton. 
For a short moment, appellant and the arresting 
officers returned to the scene. Appellant requested to be 
handcuffed. He was afraid, and did not know what he was going to 
do. He said that if he could kill the officers and get away, he 
would do so. Appellant wept as he saw Carla Taylor's two young 
children carried from the apartment. "If only Darla (Darla 
Cates) had been there," he said. We know that Darla was not 
getting along with Jerome. we also know that Darla had spent at 
least one night with appellant, although Darla claimed that they 
did not have intercourse. Apparently, he got drunk and passed 
out before things got that far along. 
Yet it is easy to see how appellant might have 
remembered that night and also have remembered the discord 
between Darla cates and Jerome. Appellant and Darla are quite 
possibly attracted to each other. Appellant went to see her, 
intending perhaps not to pass out this time, but Carla is no 
longer in Jerome's apartment or in the apartment of her friend, 
Carla Taylor. However, Carla, a mutual acquaintance of Darla's 
and appellant's was there. But she resisted his advances. We 
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know that she refused to date black men CA. 653). Appellant 
persisted in his attempts, which changed from sexual advances to 
attempted rape. Enraged at her refusal, appellant assaulted her. 
A loud scream and the noises of a fight ensued. Carla continued 
1 o resist as appe 11 ant beat, stabbed and finally murdered her. 
·'';me time, either before or after the fatal blow, appellant thrust 
a toothbrush into Carla's vagina. We can only guess what this 
act symbolized to him. The above scene is reasonable and the 
evidence is sufficient to support it beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Appellant makes two claims; one, the evidence does not 
support attempted rape and/or sexual assault; two, Jerome 
Thornton had a motive for the murder. 
The evidence supports the attempted rape charge. A 
public hair was found on the lower portion of the victim's 
buttocks which matched appellant's own pubic hair. Twenty 
individual characteristics found in appellant's hair exactly 
matched those of the hair found on the victim. Out of 10 ,000 
samples, F.B.I. expert Mike Malone had seen only two occasions 
when samples from two people were indi sti ngui shabl e. Further-
more, the hair on the victim had been forcibly removed from its 
host; it had not fallen off by natural shedding. Also, there 
were b{.Q wounds to the victim's vagina; one probably caused by a 
sharp object--the toothbrush--and another more likely caused by 
the violent penetration of a penis. Coupled with the fact that 
ejaculation often does not occur during rape, it becomes 
reasonably apparent that appellant attempted to penetrate the 
victim and, during the act several of his public hairs broke off 
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and was left on the victim. Appellant's attempts were so violent 
that he bruised the victim's vagina. 
Secondly, appellant presented some evidence tending to 
show that Thornton had a motive for killing the victim. Yet, 
appellant presented no evidence showing that Thornton acted upon 
this motive. The presence of another's motive to kill a victim 
is simply not enough, by itself, to create a reasonable doubt 
that the accused did not commit the crime. If the above were not 
true, then conviction would never be had, for there are few 
people indeed who have not, like Carla, participated in a fallout 
between lovers. Appellant's argument is merely an attempt to 
misdirect the court's attention and does nothing to lessen the 
substantiality of the evidence supporting appellant's own guilt. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO DISMISS 
THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
Appellant also claims, in Point IX of his brief, that 
the evidence was insufficient to support even a charge of capital 
homicide. Respondent has already shown that the evidence was 
sufficient to support a conviction based on the aggravating 
circumstances. It follows that the district court could not have 
erred in refusing to dismiss the aggravating circumstances of 
attempted rape or sexual assault. 
CONCLUSION 
All evidence gathered by the investigating officers 
either falls under exceptions to the prohibition against 
warrantless searches or was freely volunteered by the appellant. 
The search warrants were based on adequate, legal, and 
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independent probable cause. Appellant freely and knowingly 
waived his M.innda rights. Any statements made before the waiver 
were not coerced by the police, but were voluntary responses to 
investigatory questions. There was reasonable cause shown for 
granting the continuances to appellant's preliminary hearing. 
F111thermore, appellant's right to a fair trial was not prejudiced 
by any alleged errors in the preliminary proceedings. Therefore 
those alleged errors can be grounds for reversal. Finally, the 
evidence is sufficient to supper t both the charge of and 
conviction for capital homicide. The trial court verdict should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this Jf-tli::: ?L~-, 
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